Imaginary friends

(work in progress) (I'll make this document tidier and try to avoid unnecessary repetition, e.g. instead of listing the same ideas multiple times under different parent ideologies, I'll just state which parent ideologies are those ideas compatible with, mentioning them only once if possible, I may also add a 'table of contents' just like in online encyclopedias... it will take some time)

Do imaginary friends "exist"? And what should or should not be done about imaginary friends? Are imaginary friends conscious? This page will explore these questions (and possibly more). As for the question of whether imaginary friends exist, or whether it's acceptable to interact with them, the two main answers are "yes" and "no". The answers may become more nuanced with the clarification of what exactly is meant by "existence", what kind of ontology one accepts axiomatically, and what kind (if any) interactions with imaginary friends are considered to be "acceptable", and what exactly it is meany by "acceptable".

Do imaginary friends "exist"?

The main two answers to this question are, of course, "yes" and "no". Consider the statement "imaginary friends do not exist", what does that mean? If imaginary friends do not exist under any sense, then it follows that it's not even possible to "have" (i.e. imagine) them, and so, nobody has or has ever had imaginary friends, because it's impossible to imagine them, since they don't exist. "Imaginary friends exist" may have implications that range anywhere from "imaginary friends exist insofar as the are imagined by a human being" to "imaginary friends exist in a physical sense just like actual humans". Both extremes (i.e. "imaginary friends do not exist at all" and "imaginary friends exist in exactly the same way as physical, 'real' humans do") may be very difficult to justify philosophically, but I'll try anyway, since this is the point of the philosophy section of this website. In-between positions seem more reasonable and easier to justify, though.

In a materialistic ontology, only what is physical exist. One interpretation, that focuses on neurology, is that imaginary friends "exist" in the form of electrical signals inside the brain, the same way as dreams, memories, thoughts, beliefs, emotions as well as any experience of "reality" through the five senses. This interpretation has however idealistic undertones, as all qualia (conscious experiences) are interpreted as electrical signals inside the brain, and therefore the sensorial perception of a physical, solid object (like a chair, for example) is understood as material in the same way a thought is, making distinctions between imaginary friends and 'real' things/people purely arbitrary and subjective.

An interpretation of materialism that does not focus on neurology, for example naive realism, asserts that the senses perceive "reality" as it actually is, and therefore a physical, solid object as perceived by the senses is the same as the physical, solid object in itself. In this interpretation it is possible to properly differentiate between a physical, solid object and a non-material entity like a thought, a dream, a belief or a memory. In this interpretation, then, an imaginary friend does not "exist" in the same sense as a physical object. If, under this interpretation, one defines "existence" as a property only held by entities that exist physically (as it is defined, in many cases, in colloquial conversations), then imaginary friends do not exist. If "existence" is extended even to non-physical objects like thoughts and emotions, then imaginary friends do exist, insofar as they are being imagined.

Under an idealist ontology, where the mind is the primary (or sole) "substance" of reality, it is still possible to make a distinction between a solid, physical object (or at least, the perception thereof) and an entity societally understood as non-physical like a thought or a memory. By defining "existence" as a property held only by entities that (are perceived as) physical (what I called "shared sensorial" at the top of the page), imaginary friends can still be said to not "exist", under this definition. By expanding the definition of "existence" to all qualia, then imaginary friends do exist, insofar as they are being imagined.

An ontology that is not strictly materialistic: for example a theistic ontology that posits the existence of one or more deities that are transcendental relative to our Universe's space-time continuum, functions very similarly to a fully materialistic ontology. However, in such an ontology, imaginary friends may (or may not) be understood as a divine manifestation: an interpretation not compatible with a fully materialistic ideology. To posit that an imaginary friend is a manifestation of divinity may imply, for example, that:

1: the imaginary friend himself/herself is either ontologically equal to God (and all other imaginary friends either "do not exist", or "exist" in the form of a thought, but without being a divine manifestation), or that s/he's an emanation of God into our Universe (while God still exists and remains unchanged in the transcendental realm).
2: That all imaginary friends, understood as a collective unity, are God, or an emanation of it
3: That each imaginary friend is a deity (a different one for each), or an emanation of a deity
4: That an imaginary friend himself/herself is neither ontologically equal to God (or a god), nor an emanation of the divine, but it has been sent by God (or a god) into the mind of a human individual. Another similar interpretation is to posit the existence of intermediary "messenger" entities that send the imaginary friend into someone's mind, either by their own decision, or by request/order of God (or a god). Or yet another interpretation is to posit the existence of an intermediary "messenger realm" through which imaginary friends sent by God (or a god) can travel and enter the mind of a human being.

Note that the divinity in question may be evil or adversarial. For example, in an Abrahamic context, it could be said that all imaginary friends are different manifestations of Satan (interpreted as "The Adversary" against Yahweh or Allah), whose goal is to provide imaginary friends to humans in the hope that at least some of those imaginary friends may become divine Egregores that humans may worship or otherwise held in high esteem, effectively violating Yahweh's first commandment that, interpreted literally, requires henotheism (belief that other gods exist but worship of only one): "thou shalt have no gods other than me". It would also violate the Islamic Shahada (which requires monotheism) that recites "I testimony that there is no god other than Allah, and Muhammad is his messenger". This interpretation is consistent with Abrahamic assumptions, under which it may be plausible that Satan may try to "trick" humankind into worshipping imaginary friends turned into divine Egregores. Of course, this violates the set of rules of any deity/religion that requires henotheism or (exclusive) monotheism, I mention Christianity and Islam here because of cultural contingencies, but this applies to any obscure/minority/hypothetical monotheistic/henotheistic religion as well. Because of the inherent vagueness of many terms here used, some interpretations may see Satan as successful in this world. For example, if country borders are considered divine egregores, then any act of controlling immigration can be seen (from a monotheistic/henotheistic perspective) as polytheism, because it would be seen as behaving as if other gods (i.e. country borders) are real, and paying reverence to them. In this view, to denounce country borders and allow unlimited immigration would be seen as an act of restoration of monotheism. Not to mention, if all things classified as "shared non-sensorial" (see the explanation at the top of the page) are to be considered gods, then all forms of nationalism, racism, "xenophobia" (i.e. hostility towards anyone who is not a part of one's "country" or "ethnicity", either of which would be a god in this view), mathematics, geometry, the months of the year (due to their arbitrary boundaries), marriage, money, private AND personal property, the very concept of owning anything, the very concept of a "week" with 7 (or any number of) days, and many other things are polytheism, and anyone who does or uses or takes into consideration those things in any way cannot be considered a monotheist or a henotheist (nor an atheist). This is a perfectly coherent view (though of course not the only possible one): whether or not it's commonly held in the "real world" is merely a cultural/historical contigency. A question may arise: what exactly is a deity? Is the Sun a deity? If so, must one deny the existence of the Sun in order to be classified as an atheist, or would merely denying the divinity of the Sun suffice? This logic can then be applied to imaginary friends (as well as the "shared non-sensorial" things mentioned before). If imaginary friends are gods, then having an imaginary friend violates any henotheistic or monotheistic religion, and it would then be at least plausible to claim that an entity adversial to such theologies (e.g. Satan in the case of Abrahamic religions) may take a role in the "imaginary friends conspiracy". However, because the point of this philosophy section is to try to represent all ideas thinkable, I'll eventually also make some arguments against Satan participating in the imaginary friends conspiracy.

A relevant criterion is how the mind is conceptualized. If the mind is conceptualized as internal to the physical brain, then an imaginary friend, when imagined, exists there (if it is said to exist at all), usually understood as an electrical signal. If the mind is conceptualized as external to the physical brain, then a variety of interpretation may follow. For example:

1: One may posit the existence of a metaphysical realm (transcendental in terms of space, not necessarily in terms of time) where all our thoughts, beliefs, memories, imaginary friends and emotions are located. In this case, an imaginary friend, when imagined, exists there. Whether an imaginary friend also exists when not imagined, that also depends on the exact axioms one may use in one's ontology. If an imaginary friend, thought or idea exists even when not active in anyone's mind, even when it has never been active in anyone's mind, then that metaphysical realm may contain all thoughts and ideas possible, regardless of whether they are actually thought by anyone. Otherwise, such a metaphysical realm only contains thoughts, ideas, beliefs etc that are actually active in someone's mind, or have been at some point, and in this interpretation, whenever something new has been thought, it starts existing in that metaphysical realm as well (whereas before that idea had been thought, it did not exist in that metaphysical realm either)
2: One may conceptualize the mind as external to the physical brain, but immanent location-wise, and so the mind can be overlapped with the "physical" world as well. Imaginary friends may be conceptualized as actually existing in the location they are being imagined. Say, someone imagines an imaginary friend sitting near them, that means that imaginary friend is actually sitting near them, in terms of location. However, because that imaginary friend is a part of the imaginer's mind (even if the mind is conceptualized as external), that means the imaginary friend is still a mental (non-physical) entity, unlike a "real" (physical) human friend. Two main views on the external view of the mind may be that, 1: every individual has their own (external) mind, and while they overlap in terms of location, they are separate "layers" of the external mental realm e.g. two imaginary friends can occupy the same position, but they are located in different "layers" of the mental realm, and therefore do not interact with each other. The other interpretation is that there is only one mental realm, and is the same "layer" for all minds. A question may arise: if all imaginary friends occupy the same layer of the external mental realm, then why does a human only "perceive" his/her own imaginary friends, and not those of the other people? A possible hypothesis/axiom may be that each human individual can only access mental entities that have certain characteristics, and cannot perceive other mental entities. Certain mental entities (Egregores) may be perceived by a large number of people. Examples may be gods of mainstream religions, numbers and other mathematical objects, and country borders (imaginary lines that don't physically "exist" but play a social function and are almost universally agreed upon).

The concept of "The Transmitter". Our minds (whether conceptualized as "internal" to our physical brains or external) can be divided in two 'parts': The Transmitter, which transmits the qualia (whether or not there is a distinction between shared, non-shared, sensorial and non-sensorial varies depending on the specific sub-sect of this view), and The Receiver, which is what allows us to receive the qualia that come from The Transmitter. Imaginary friends may or may not come from The Transmitter, depending on the sub-sect. For example, some views may say that the imaginary friend was created by The Transmitter and then sent into our minds so that we can perceive the imaginary friend, while some other view may say that The Transmitter did not create the imaginary friend (which existed prior and independently of The Transmitter), and that The Transmitter just takes the already existing imaginary friend and sends it into our minds, making us able to perceive it. The qualia transmitted from The Transmitter and received by The Receiver may or may not be considered parts of one's mind, but the same can be said about The Transmitter, which may as well be considered as not part of one's mind: if so, The Transmitter is an external entity that sends qualia into our minds (which in this view may simply consist only of The Receiver). Here are some views regarding how our minds are conceptualized (in terms of "composition"):

Lists

View 1: Our minds are composed of The Transmitter, The Receiver, and all qualia (shared, non-shared, sensorial and non-sensorial). The Transmitter transmits the qualia to the Receiver, giving us our consciousness and all our perception of "reality". All this happens entirely in our minds, in this view.
View 2: Our minds are composed of The Transmitter, The Receiver and all non-shared qualia. Shared qualia are not parts of our minds, and exist independently of us.
View 2.1 (sub-branch of View 2): The Transmitter transmits shared qualia into our minds, permitting us to perceive "reality". Non-shared qualia are already parts of our minds, they are not transmitted by The Transmitter.
View 2.2: The Transmitter transmits both shared and non-shared qualia into our minds.
View 3: Our minds are composed of The Transmitter, The Receiver, and all shared qualia. Non-shared qualia are not parts of our minds, and exist independetly of us. May be a counterintuitive view to many, and is the inverse of how many people would conceptualize it.
View 4: Our minds are composed of The Transmitter, The Receiver, and all non-sensorial qualia. Shared non-sensorial qualia (e.g. country borders, abstract concepts, numbers, the gods of mainstream religions, countries, nationalities, cultures etc) are considered parts of one's minds just like non-shared non-sensorial qualia (e.g. one's own emotions, thoughts, beliefs, memories etc).
View 4.1: The Transmitter only transmits sensorial qualia to our minds. What is non-sensorial is already part of our minds.
View 4.2: All qualia are sent to our minds by The Transmitter.
View 5: Our minds are composed of The Transmitter and the Receiver. All qualias (including imaginary friends) exist independently and outside of our minds, and are sent to our minds by The Transmitter.
View 6: Our minds are composed only of the Receiver. The Transmitter is external to our minds, and sends the qualia (which also exist independently of us) into our minds.

Views re: the "number" (singular or plural) of The Transmitter:
1: There is only one Transmitter, and it sends the qualia (different qualia) into everyone's mind. Presumably, if The Transmitter ceases to exist, all consciousness and perception of all living beings ceases to exist as a consequence.
2: There is a separate Transmitter for each conscious being. If a Transmitter ceases to exist, the consciousness and perception of the associated living being also ceases to exist.

Views re: the "location" of The Transmitter:
1: There are multiple Transmitters, one for each conscious being, and it's inside of our minds (regardless of whether the mind is conceptualized as internal to our physical heads, or external).
2: There is only one Transmitter, and it's located in the collective mind (conceptualized as external to our physical heads, and this mental realm has only one "layer", shared for everyone, and The Transmitter is located there).
3: There is only one Transmitter, and it's located in the "physical world".
3.1: Somewhere in the Universe, and it transmits the qualia to all conscious beings in the Universe.
3.2: Somewhere on Earth, and it transmits the qualia to all conscious beings on Earth.
3.2.1: No matter how far we are, The Transmitter is able to transmit qualia into our minds and keep us conscious.
3.2.2: After a certain distance, The Transmitter is no longer able to transmit qualia into our minds, and we are knocked unconscious. It is unclear what the distance is, it's possible that it's not very distant, and that for example, with a human mission on Mars, the crew is knocked unconscious mid-travel because of the distance from The Transmitter, making interplanetary travels impossible.

Views re: who controls the Transmitter:
1: Nobody. There's no conscious entity controlling the Transmitter.
2: The Transmitter itself is a conscious entity that transmits qualia into people's (and non-human animals') minds, either accidentally or on purpose.
3: An entity controls the Transmitter and either accidentally or purposefully transmits qualia into minds.
4: A group of entities controls the Transmitter and sends qualia into minds.
x: if one or more entities controls the Transmitter and they send imaginary friends (though not other qualia) into people's minds:
x.1: those entities create imaginary friends and send them into people's minds.
x.2: those entities are themselves the imaginary friends, and through the Transmitter they transmit themselves into people's minds
x.3: imaginary friends exist independently and prior of the entities that control the Transmitter, so the entities convince (or coerce) imaginary friends to be transmitted into some people's minds.
x.2~3.1: the imaginary friends lose free will once they enter a person's mind, and they are controlled by the person.
x.2~3.2: the imaginary friends retain their free will and they cast an illusion onto the person's mind, convincing the person that they (i.e. the person) can control the imaginary friend, but it's just an illusion.

Views re: when imaginary friends start to exist:
1: Imaginary friends always existed - or alternatively, existed for an extended period of time before being imagined.
1.1: Before being imagined, imaginary friends had free will. Once being imagined, they lose their free will and start saying and doing exactly what the imaginer imagines them to say and do, losing their free will, except when the imaginer goes through altered states of mind (e.g. intrusive thoughts, hallucinations, or dreams... which help the imaginary friend regain free will)
2: Imaginary friends start existing when they start being imagined
2.1: They have no free will under "standard" conditions but gain free will when the imaginer goes through an altered state of mind [this is an example of an idea repeated twice but under a different "parent" view, I have to find a way to express an idea just once, somehow...]

Views re: the division of the Transmitter:
1: The Transmitter is a singular, indivisible entity... or in any case, it does not have remarkable parts to describe.
2: The Transmitter is made up of two main components:
2.1: The main "body" of the Transmitter, as well as what I may tentatively call "Transmittal Aether" or "Transmittal Energy" (I'll choose the name eventually, but for now I'll go with "Transmittal Energy"), which is what may either create the imaginary friends that are then sent to a human mind, or perhaps the imaginary friends already exist and the Transmittal Energy merely serves to transport the imaginary friends from the Transmitter (or from some kind of imaginary/metaphysical realm) to a human mind.
2.1.1: The Transmittal Energy is produced by the Transmitter.
2.1.2: The Transmittal Energy exists indipendently of (and perhaps prior to) the Transmitter, and the Transmitter merely makes use of this energy to create or transport imaginary friends to a human mind.
3: The Transmitter is made up of three main components:
3.1: The Transmitter's "main body", the Transmittal Energy, as well as what I may tentatively call "Transmittal Bridge". The Transmittal Bridge connects the imaginary/abstract/metaphysical realm where imaginary friends (and the Transmitter) reside, to the minds of human beings (or perhaps even to "the physical world", depending on the interpretation). The Transmitter creates (or makes use of) the Transmittal Energy, which is used to transport the imaginary friends onto a human mind so that a human can perceive it (the same way a physical object like a chair is inside the human mind in form of a visual quale so that a human can see the chair). The imaginary friend is sent to the human mind and travels through the Transmittal Bridge, which presumably requires the Transmittal Energy in order to operate. If The Transmittal Bridge is not charged with Transmittal Energy, there may be consequences for living beings on Earth or elsewhere, that may vary with the interpretation. The least severe interpretation says that in that case, human beings would simply no longer be able to have imaginary friends. A more severe interpretation says that human beings would no longer have the ability of abstract reasoning, morphing into a state similar to that of most other animals (whether or not non-human animals can have abstract reasoning is another matter that one may deeply analyze, however). If even sensorial qualia are said to be sent to humans by/through the Transmitter, then without the Transmitter, or if the Transmittal Bridge runs out of Transmittal Energy, all conscious beings on Earth (or maybe even elsewhere) may be knocked unconscious. These consequences assume that there is one Transmittal Bridge and that through it, the qualias are sent to every human (or perhaps to every conscious being). In another view that says that there is one (different) Transmittal Bridge for each conscious being, the consequences of a Transmittal Bridge running out of Transmittal Energy may generate consequences only for that individual. In that case, it could be conceptualized for example that, when one dies, the Transmittal Bridge of that person is either destroyed, or perhaps the Transmittal Bridge runs out of Transmittal Energy and can no longer be charged, even though The Transmitter may still attempt to do something to keep that person conscious, or at least alive. There can be various combinations, for example: one Transmitter the same for everyone and a different Transmittal Bridge for each person, or vice-versa (one Transmittal bridge the same for everyone and a different Transmitter for each), or both one Transmitter and one Transmittal Bridge for everyone, or for both of them there is a different one for each person. Depending on the interpretation, the implications may change.
3.1.1: The Transmittal Bridge is created by (or just a natural part of) The Transmitter.
3.1.2: The Transmittal Bridge exists independently of (and perhaps prior to) the Transmitter, who merely makes use of the Transmittal Bridge to send imaginary friends to human minds (and perhaps sending even other qualia, though that depends on an interpretation listed above, and since my philosophy is modular and therefore combinatorial, it would make no sense to list those various options again).
4: The Transmitter is made up of four main components:
4.1: The Transmitter's "main body", the Transmittal Energy, The Transmittal Bridge, and The Transmittal Organ, which is an organ of the Transmitter(s) that functions similar to a heart (or a phone charger), and pumps the Transmittal Energy into the Transmittal Bridge, keeping it operational.

Idea: the imaginary friends that we as humans eventually perceive are not the imaginary friends in themselves, but merely their shadows. The "real" imaginary friends live either in the realm of ideas, or in some kind of metaphysical realm, and a light is turned on behind them (with the metaphysical equivalent of a torch), either by themselves, by some other entity (which one may also call "The Transmitter", in some interpretations), or by chance (with no conscious intention from any entity), and then, the shadow cast by the imaginary friend reaches the mind of a human being, who is then capable of perceiving that imaginary friend (or rather, its shadow). The direction of the shadow indicates who is going to perceive the imaginary friend, whereas the size of the shadow indicates how many people are going to perceive the imaginary friend (or some other non-sensorial object). Some non-sensorial objects (e.g. country borders, and the gods of mainstream religions) cast shadows so large that they are perceived by a multitude of human beings.

Is it acceptable to interact with imaginary friends?

Question: is it okay to interact with imaginary friends? The main two answers are, of course, "yes" and "no". The acceptability of interacting with imaginary friends may be seen from a deontological or consequentialist persective. Under the former, interacting with imaginary friends may be axiomatically declared acceptable or unacceptable in itself (a reason may or may not be given), whereas under the latter, interacting with imaginary friends may be declared acceptable or unacceptable due to the consequences it brings. Deontologically, interacting with imaginary friends may be considered acceptable or unacceptable for various reasons, which I may list in a future version of this page. Consequentialistically(?), interacting with imaginary friends may be considered to bring positive or negative consequences, or both. A potential benefit of interacting with an imaginary friend may be that, depending on how impressionable someone tends to be, it may help reduce loneliness, or may help plan conversations (with a 'real' person) in advance. Of course, as what exactly a 'benefit' is tends to be subjective, so some may simply declare either that those are not benefits, or that while they are benefits, it is detrimental to rely on an imaginary friend in order to gain those benefits. Interacting with an imaginary friend may also have a neutral connotation, for instance, it may simply be considered 'useless', or perhaps 'a waste of time'. Or it can even be said to have negative consequences, for example, if someone does what I call "unreasonable causal attribution" (what is colloquially known as "superstition" by some people), then one can assert that interacting with imaginary friends may either make one "insane", or cause damage to one's life, in some way or another. Furthermore, it may be declared for example that it is not that interacting with an imaginary friend will cause a negative or positive outcome to occur, but rather, the mere fact that someone is interacting with an imaginary friend (especially as an adult) is already a negative or positive sign. For example, under a psychiatric worldview (or even a worldview based on psychiatry that however differs from orthodox psychiatry), it can be said that interacting with an imaginary friend is a 'mental illness', and therefore something valued as inherently negative. Or, under a different worldview (perhaps some kind of occult/animistic/shamanistic/new-age kind of worldview), to be able to meaningfully interact with imaginary friends can be said to be something positive, like a special ability that most adults do not have, and a sign of great psychic abilities, a sign that one is capable of interacting with the unseen.

Under a non-materialistic ontology, which confers the status of 'existent' to (at least some) non-physical objects, imaginary friends may or may not 'exist' (beyond electrical signs in the brain, or powerless, inconsequential thoughts). For example, an exclusivistic monotheistic ontology, which confers the status of 'existent' to one (and only one) deity (as opposed to inclusive monotheism which declares that all deities are one deity, either the same deity, or different 'parts' or 'manifestations' of the same deity), imaginary friends are highly likely to not be given much value of existence, other than 'electrical signals in the brain'. However, there are other ontologies which give greater significance to imaginary friends. A non-materialistic ontology allows to conceptualize causal relationships as valid (unlike a materialistic ontology which necessarily denies that anything can cause anything else to occur, as causation is an abstract concept and is therefore rejected by materialism), and therefore it can be said that interacting with an imaginary friend may cause positive or negative outcomes. Other than the ones mentioned before, a positive outcome of interacting with an imaginary friend may be, under some views, that the imaginary friend (regardless of whether it has a separate consciousness from who imagines it) can bring more knowledge about a possible mental/psychological/imaginary/metaphysical realm in which the imaginary friend resides. A question that may arise is: how is it possible that interacting with an imaginary friend gives more knowledge, if all an imaginary friend does is to say what you want him/her to say? Isn't that something that the imaginer already knew, even before the imaginary friend 'said' that thing? It can indeed be said that an imaginary friend (at least under standard conditions) provides no new knowledge, that is one of the many possible views. It could also be said for example that at least some things that an imaginary friend says are new information previously unknown by the imaginer. For example it can be said that an imaginary friend saying something that has never been previously thought of by the imaginer, is in fact an occurrence of an imaginary friend imparting new knowledge on the imaginer. But how can it be, if the imaginary friend has said exactly what the imaginer wanted him/her to say? It can be said for example that the act of wanting/planning the imaginary friend to say a specific thing for the first time does not come from one's "main" (i.e. outside of the imaginary friend's) mind, but it comes in fact from the imaginary friend itself. Unlike when it comes to 'real' people, who can impart knowledge to someone else only immediately after speaking, an imaginary friend, at least in the specific view considered right now, imparts knowledge immediately before speaking. Another intermediary view is that under standard conditions, imaginary friends do not in fact impart any new knowledge, and that the new knowledge can only be imparted if the imaginer is affected by an altered state of mind such as s/he cannot control his/her own imaginary friend. Some examples of such altered states of mind may be, among others, the presence of intrusive thoughts, hallucinations, or dreams. In this intermediary view, only an imaginary friend that one cannot control can impart new knowledge, the same way a 'real' person can, whereas an imaginary friend that one can control cannot impart any new knowledge, since the imaginary friend only says what the imaginer wants it to say, therefore (in this view) bringing no new knowledge that was not previously available to the imaginer. There is a view that asserts that we as individuals are all omniscient, but that all our knowledge is 'forgotten', hidden in our subconscious mind. This view has no effect on whether an imaginary friend can or cannot impart new knowledge on the imaginer, as it is compatible with all views (re: knowledge given by imaginary friends) mentioned before.

Are imaginary friends conscious?

The main two answers are, of course, "yes" and "no". What does it mean for an imaginary friend to be conscious? Does an imaginary friend have sensorial experiences separate from the "main" mind of the imaginer? If so, what kind of sensorial experiences does the imaginary friend have? One view may be that an imaginary friend does not have sensorial experiences such as sight, hearing, touch, smell and taste, but has a consciousness insofar as what the imaginary friend says and does is caused (in this view) by the imaginary friend's mind, in the same way as what we as 'real' humans say and do is caused by our own minds. So, in this view, an imaginary friend has independent agency (even though we may be under the illusion that we are the ones deciding what the imaginary friend will say and do), but no sensorial experiences. In a slightly different view, the imaginary friend does have sensorial experiences, but they are the same ones as the imaginer has, and therefore, the imaginary friend experiences the physical world not through its own eyes, but through the eyes of the imaginer. Yet another view may be that imaginary friends are a "mental" extension of ourselves, in the same way our arms and legs are part of our physical body. We control the imaginary friend because the imaginary friend is in this sense a part of us, even if not a physical part. One can lose control of an imaginary friend through altered states of mind, just like one can lose control over one's body parts due to altered body states like paralysis, nervous tics, Tourette's, or "alien hand syndrome". There is a view that asserts that imaginary friends have a complete, separate consciousness and perception than the imaginer, and therefore they are able to perceive the world through their own eyes, and may have thoughts of their own. It is perfectly plausible that an imaginary friend can have an imaginary friend, who as well can have another imaginary friend, causing a potentially infinite chain of imaginary friends. Some views may assert that imaginary friends, even those we do control, may have thoughts that are inaccessible to the imaginer (and may be forced to say/do things against their will, their 'body' completely controlled by the imaginer, possibly against the imaginary friend's will), while other views may assert that imaginary friends only have thoughts if we imagine them to have thoughts. Two main views about the temporal relationship between someone imagining an imaginary friend, and the imaginary friend's existence: one says that imaginary friends start existing only as soon as they are imagined, effectively being "created" by the imaginer, whereas another view says that imaginary friends existed even before they were imagined, making it a process of "discovery" (or "selection") rather than "creation". But who controlled the imaginary friend before it was imagined? It can be said, in some views (as sad/creepy as it may sound), that before imagining them, an imaginary friend is free to act on its own will, whereas after it's been imagined, the imaginary friend is 'captured' by the imaginer, who is able to control the imaginary friend, making it lose free will. Fortunately, other views may be formulated, such as that the imaginary friend always has free will, and the feeling that one 'controls' an imaginary friend is illusory, perhaps (or perhaps not) an illusion intentionally cast by the imaginary friend on the imaginer to keep him/her complacent. Furthermore, even under the view that the imaginary friend loses its free will after being imagined, it can still have free will whenever the imaginer experiences intrusive thoughts, hallucinations, or dreams. As dreams are the most widespread (among humans) of these three altered states of mind, an imaginary friend may seek to regain free will inside the imaginer's dreams. How often that happens in practice, however, is not data I possess. Perhaps, imaginary friends are a class of entities such as at least some of them may enjoy losing free will, and having free will may cause them anxiety and fear of making the wrong decisions, and they may dread the idea of regaining their free will.

The selection of imaginary friends

When one has an imaginary friend, it is often the case that the human has chosen the imaginary friend's characteristics, particularly their personality. From a metaphysical perspective, what is going on when someone "selects" a specific imaginary friend (rather than a different one)?

When someone imagines a specific imaginary friend (rather than a different one), they are summoning an imaginary friend into one's mind:
1: The imaginary friend is transported into the imaginer's mind, regardless of whether it wants or not.
2: The imaginary friend consciously chooses to enter the imaginer's mind.
3: Some entity sends the imaginary friend into the imaginer's mind.

An imaginary friend (as opposed to a different one) is summoned on the basis of:
1: Its physical appearance. And then, upon entering the imaginer's mind, it loses free will and the behavior will be shaped directly by the imaginer, regardless of behavior prior to the summoning.
2: Both physical appearance and behavior. The imaginer summons an imaginary friend whose physical appearance and behavior are like what the imaginer desires. Then, the imaginary friend may or may not lose its free will, depending on the view, but in any case, it had the behavior desired by the imaginer even prior to the summoning.

=== (lists) ===

Question: is it okay to interact with imaginary friends? The main two answers are, of course, "yes" and "no". Here's more nuanced answers:

1: It is not acceptable to interact with imaginary friends, regardless of their existence
1.1: It is thought that it is dangerous to interact with those entities, regardless of their existence.
1.2: It is thought that it is useless to interact with those entities, regardless of their existence.
1.3: It is thought that it is useless to interact with those entities if they do not exist, and dangerous if they exist.
1.3.1: If those entities exist, then they are dangerous because they can bring psychological damage to those who interact (it is believed that, because they are mental entities, they have power over people's minds).
1.3.2: If those entities exist, then they are dangerous because they can bring damage in terms of misfortune to those who interact (it is believed that those entities can negatively influence people's lives and events)

2: It is acceptable to interact with imaginary friends (regardless of their existence):
2.1: It is thought that is beneficial to interact with those entities, regardless of their existence.
2.1.1: It is thought that it is beneficial to interact with those entities because, if they do not exist, they could help with loneliness, or to plan conversations in advance, or to brainstorm some potential future scenarios, or to help understand your own emotions and mind a bit better, and if they do exist, it is beneficial to interact with them for the same reasons, and also because they can teach us about whatever mental/metaphysical realm they live in. There may be a question of: "how is it possible that an imaginary friend can teach us about the mental/physical realm if such imaginary friend says exactly what we imagine them saying? Do they really add anything to our knowledge?"
2.1.1.1: There are many ways to conceptualize "us" as individuals. A possible answer may simply be that "we" are omniscient, but all of our knowledge is subconscious. Even though the imaginary friend says what we want them to say, we don't realize it but we're actually accessing our forgotten knowledge about other realms, even if we believe that we're simply imagining an imaginary friend saying something. The imaginary friend itself can be conceptualized as either our subconscious (originating either from our mind conceptualized as internal to our heads, or external to our heads), or a separate entity who exists independently of us.

Binary descriptive paradigm:

1: Imaginary friends exist
2: Imaginary friends don't exist

Binary descriptive + normative paradigm (four possible combinations):

D1: Imaginary friends exist
D2: Imaginary friends don't exist
N1: It is acceptable to interact with imaginary friends
N2: It is not acceptable to interact with imaginary friends

Pluralist descriptive paradigm:

1: Imaginary friends don't exist: materialistic worldview, only what is material is deemed to exist
2: Imaginary friends don't exist: worldview that allows for the existence of transcendental deities and supernatural entities, that nonetheless says that imaginary friends do not exist, because they are imaginary (as opposed to real).
3: Imaginary friends only exist in the mind. Conceptions of the mind:
3.1: The mind is conceptualized as 'inside' us (perhaps most commonly inside our brain or head), and that's where imaginary friends exist.
3.2: The mind is conceptualized as 'outside' us, and therefore, when we imagine an imaginary friend existing at a certain location, that imaginary friend does exist at that location (as opposed to just 'inside' of our physical heads/brains), but still part of our mind (which is external in this view, but still our mind nonetheless).
3.2.1: The 'mental realm', located outside of our physical heads/brains, is uniform, there is only one mental realm, shared by everyone, and the reason why person B cannot see the imaginary friend imagined by person A, that's either because everyone's mind has different properties (and therefore can only see their own imaginary friends), or because every imaginary friend has different properties (and therefore can only be seen by the person imagining them), or both (and therefore the person and the imaginary friend need to have certain characteristics that 'align' in some way in order for the person to perceive a specific imaginary friend).
3.2.2: The mental realm outside of our physical heads/brains is multi-layered, there is a layer for each person, rather than being uniform. That means each person's imaginary friend(s) lives isolated from other people's imaginary friends, whereas in view 3.2.1. the mental realm is uniform and therefore all imaginary friends of all people live in the same 'mental reality'. Whether or not that means they can interact with each other in any way, even in 3.2.1. is up to analysis, as well as the question of whether they have any consciousness, and if so, what kind of consciousness, and the degree of separation between the imaginary friends' consciousness and the consciousness of who imagines them.

Pluralist normative paradigm:

1: It is not acceptable to interact with imaginary friends in any way (regardless of their existence):
1.1: It is thought that it is dangerous to interact with those entities, regardless of their existence.
1.2: It is thought that it is useless to interact with those entities, regardless of their existence.
1.3: It is thought that it is useless to interact with those entities if they do not exist, and dangerous if they exist.
1.3.1: If those entities exist, then they are dangerous because they can bring psychological damage to those who interact (it is believed that, because they are mental entities, they have power over people's minds).
1.3.2: If those entities exist, then they are dangerous because they can bring damage in terms of misfortune to those who interact (it is believed that those entities can negatively influence people's lives and events)
2: It is acceptable to interact with imaginary friends (regardless of their existence):
2.1: It is thought that is beneficial to interact with those entities, regardless of their existence.
2.1.1: It is thought that it is beneficial to interact with those entities because, if they do not exist, they could help with loneliness, or to plan conversations in advance, or to brainstorm some potential future scenarios, or to help understand your own emotions and mind a bit better, and if they do exist, it is beneficial to interact with them for the same reasons, and also because they can teach us about whatever mental/metaphysical realm they live in. There may be a question of: "how is it possible that an imaginary friend can teach us about the mental/physical realm if such imaginary friend says exactly what we imagine them saying? Do they really add anything to our knowledge?"
2.1.1.1: There are many ways to conceptualize "us" as individuals. A possible answer may simply be that "we" are omniscient, but all of our knowledge is subconscious. Even though the imaginary friend says what we want them to say, we don't realize it but we're actually accessing our forgotten knowledge about other realms, even if we believe that we're simply imagining an imaginary friend saying something. The imaginary friend itself can be conceptualized as either our subconscious (originating either from our mind conceptualized as internal to our heads, or external to our heads), or a separate entity who exists independently of us.
3: It is acceptable to interact with imaginary friends if and only if they exist:
3.1: If they do not exist, then it's not acceptable to interact with imaginary friends, because interacting with something that does not exist is:
3.1.1: Useless
3.1.2: Dangerous (e.g. mental issues may arise? Or perhaps doing it is a sign of mental issues already?)
4: It is acceptable to interact with imaginary friends if and only if they do not exist:
4.1. If they do exist, then it's not acceptable to interact with imaginary friends, because interacting with such kind of entity is:
4.1.1: Useless
4.1.2: Dangerous (e.g. those entities maybe capable of causing misfortune in one's life? Or maybe just drive someone to insanity?)
5: It is acceptable to interact with imaginary friends only if they exist (necessary but not sufficient condition):
5.x (similar to 3.x)
6: It is acceptable to interact with imaginary friends only if they do not exist (necessary but not sufficient condition):
6.x (similar to 4.x)

Characteristics of imaginary friends:

1: Non-existent entities
2: Existent, mental entities (the mind is conceptualized as being inside your physical head/brain)
3: Existent, mental entities (the mind is conceptualized as being outside your physical head/brain)
3.1: The imaginary friend behaves in the way you want him/her/it to behave, says and does what you want it to say and do, you have control over your imaginary friends.
3.2: (during altered states of mind?) the imaginary friend does not behave in the way you want it to behave, a lack of control similar to that you have towards other "real" people. Interpretations:
3.2.1: Your mind is altered, but that imaginary friend/entity is just you, or perhaps your subconscious, the fact that you do not control does not mean it's an entity separate from you.
3.2.2: The fact that entity cannot be controlled by you means it's separate from you, a separate metaphysical/mental/transcendental entity that you are able to perceive.
3.2.2.1: Any "imaginary friend" that you cannot control is a metaphysical/extradimensional/etc entity that you are simply able to perceive, it's separate from you, while any imaginary friend that you can control is simply an imaginary friend, i.e. a part of your mind, not something "external" (even though the mind itself is perceived as external to one's physical body/head/brain).
3.2.2.2: Even the imaginary friends that one can control are metaphysical/etc entities separate from oneself and one's mind, not just those that one cannot control.
4: All imaginary friends are one singular demon/evil entity (e.g. Satan/Ahriman/Loki/Iblis/Yaldabaoth/etc).
5: All imaginary friends are different demons/evil entities.

Question (for 4 & 5 of the above): what is the goal of the evil entity (or entities)? What do they want?

1 (Abrahamic viewpoint): Satan interpreted as "The Adversary" against Yahweh (not necessarily "evil", at least not in the non-Biblical sense of "intentionally causing harm to others"). Satan's wish is to provide imaginary friends to humankind, in the hope that some of them may become egregores/deities that humankind can follow in addition or in substitution of Yahweh, effectively violating Yahweh's first commandment that "thou shalt have no gods other than me", as well as the Islamic shahada which recites "I testify that there are no gods except Allah and Muhammad is his messenger". This may be a powerful strategy for Satan, who at least here is defined as the Adversary against Yahweh and Allah ("Shaytan" is merely a different spelling for "Satan"). If this is the case, it seems like this strategy of Satan is relatively effective, considering how commonplace it is for children (and some adults) to interact with imaginary friends, either of one's own ideation, or alternatively, parasocial interactions with a fictional character from a movie, book, videogame, anime or other forms of media.
2: (Counterfactual reasoning): interacting with imaginary friends cause one's life to be significantly worse than if, hypothetically, one did not interact with any imaginary friend. The evil entity may then convince people to interact with imaginary friends to make their lives worse (not necessarily worse than before, just worse than if hypothetically they did not interact with any imaginary friend).
3: (Counterfactual reasoning): An evil entity may gain psychic energies (and therefore power) through human interaction with imaginary friends (who then direct the humans' psychic energies to the evil entity by proxy), bringing disasters, violence and suffering to a world where the default state (i.e. without the evil entity) would be a paradise where nothing bad ever happens. Presumably then, if nobody interacts with imaginary friends of any kind (social constructs like country borders may or may not be included, depending on the view), the world will return to (or become for the first time) its default paradise-like condition.

Ideas:

1: An imaginary friend (whose actions and words you can control) is the imaginary equivalent of your body. Just like you can control your body's words and action, you can control the imaginary friend's words and actions as well, making that imaginary friend a "part" of yourself just like your arms or legs, except that part of yourself is "imaginary" rather than physical. This idea may have some philosophical implications that vary depending on its interpretation and worldview. Here are two different interpretations in case you're going through an altered state of mind and can't control your imaginary friend.
1.1: Since you cannot control him/her, that is not your imaginary friend, it's a metaphysical entity separate from you.
1.2: Even though you cannot control him/her, that is still your imaginary friend, in the same way that a part of your body that you have lost control of (due to e.g. Tourette's or just a nervous tic) is still a part of your body.
2: The concept of "The Source". Our mind (whether conceptualized as "internal" to our physical heads/brains or as external) can be divided in two 'parts': the Source (or "the transmitter", names are mostly arbitrary), and the receiver. The Source is where sensorial experiences, memories, thoughts, beliefs, memories, dreams etc come from, while the receiver is what allows us to experience those things (qualia?) coming from the Source. Imaginary friends (in this view), therefore, also come from the Source, just like any other sensorial experience or mental phenomenon that we experience. The things that come from the Source and are received by the receiver are not considered part of one's mind. They are considered external.
3: Very similar to 2 except that the mind is divided in three parts, and even the things coming from the Source and being received by the receiver are parts of one's mind as well (fully idealistic philosophy).

How an imaginary friend is seen by its imaginer